Leading Economic Index: 10 Forward-Looking Indicators in One Composite
The Conference Board Leading Economic Index is the most-cited composite recession-prediction tool in modern US business-cycle analysis. Published monthly by The Conference Board since the early 1960s, the index aggregates ten forward-looking economic indicators into a single composite. The construction is designed to anticipate business-cycle turning points by 3 to 9 months on average, with the recession-prediction record validated against every NBER-dated US recession since 1959.
The current 2024-26 cycle has produced the most challenging interpretation in the LEI's 60-year history. The index fell for an extended run through 2022-2024, among the longest stretches of sustained non-recessionary decline in the series history, with the 6-month annualised change reaching deeply negative readings in 2024, well past the historical recession-watch threshold. By all standard interpretive rules, the index was signalling a recession that did not materialise on the historical lead-time schedule. In 2026 the decline has eased to a roughly flat trend, with mixed monthly prints: the index rose in February 2026, fell 0.6 percent in March, and edged up 0.1 percent in April to 97.4 (2016 = 100). The May 2026 reading is due 18 June 2026 and will help show whether the stabilisation is firming.
The Ten Components and Their Weights
The current LEI composition includes ten indicators across five categories: manufacturing-sector signals (manufacturing hours, ISM new orders, manufacturers new orders for consumer goods, manufacturers new orders for capital goods); labour-market signals (initial jobless claims); housing-cycle signals (building permits); financial-market signals (S&P 500 stock prices, the Leading Credit Index, the interest rate spread); and consumer-expectations signals (University of Michigan consumer expectations).
The weights are designed to reflect each component's historical track record as a leading indicator, with periodic rebalancing to reflect changing economic structure. Manufacturing-related components carry approximately 65 percent of the total weight (manufacturing hours 21.4 percent, ISM new orders 21.4 percent, manufacturers new orders for consumer goods 5.7 percent, manufacturers new orders for capital goods 8.2 percent, building permits 9.1 percent). Financial-market components carry approximately 32 percent (interest rate spread 13.5 percent, S&P 500 7.6 percent, Leading Credit Index 10.5 percent, with manufacturing hours overlapping). Labour-market and consumer-expectations components carry the remaining 15-20 percent.
The heavy manufacturing weight is the central interpretive challenge for the modern US economy. With manufacturing now only 11 percent of US GDP (down from 25 percent in the 1950s when the LEI was originally constructed), a manufacturing-driven LEI decline may overstate the broader macroeconomic implications. The 2024-25 episode, where manufacturing weakness drove sustained LEI decline without broader recession, may reflect this structural mismatch.
The Three Recession-Watch Rules
The Conference Board uses three rules of thumb for translating LEI movements into recession assessments. First, the 6-month annualised rate of change is the preferred summary metric. Readings below negative 4 percent, sustained for several months, are a recession-watch signal. The 6-month change has the advantage of smoothing single-month volatility while preserving timing sensitivity for cyclical inflections. It has improved markedly from its deeply negative 2024 low toward roughly flat in 2026, though it has hovered near zero rather than turning convincingly positive.
Second, six consecutive months of negative monthly readings is a recession-warning signal. The 2024-25 cycle exceeded this threshold by a wide margin, registering a long run of consecutive monthly declines before the trend eased toward flat in 2026. Historically, six consecutive monthly declines have been a reliable recession warning, though the 2024-25 episode is the largest exception to that pattern.
Third, the diffusion index of components (the percentage of components rising versus falling) below 50 sustained is a confirming signal. During recessions, the diffusion index typically falls below 30 (most components contracting). During expansions, it typically runs above 60 (most components expanding). The 2024-25 cycle saw the diffusion index sustained between 30 and 50, indicating broad but not complete component-level weakness, consistent with the manufacturing-driven character of the cycle.
The Historical Track Record
The LEI has confirmed every NBER-dated US recession since 1959. The average lead-time from LEI peak to recession peak has been 3 to 9 months, with substantial variation. The 1973-75 recession had a 3-month LEI lead. The 1990-91 recession had a 6-month LEI lead. The 2007-09 Great Recession had an 18-month LEI lead, with the LEI peak in 2006 well before the December 2007 recession start. The 2020 COVID recession had essentially no LEI lead because the public-health shock was external to the indicators that the LEI tracks.
False signals have been rare but not absent. The 1995-96 LEI decline did not produce a recession; the Fed engineered a soft landing through monetary easing. The 2015-16 LEI decline did not produce a recession; the manufacturing-specific weakness from the oil-price collapse did not propagate to services or to the broader economy. The 2024-25 LEI decline is the longest non-recessionary period of sustained decline in the series history.
If a recession is dated by NBER for late 2026 or 2027, the LEI will have produced an unusually long lead-time signal but the relationship to the historical pattern will be preserved. If no recession occurs in that window, the 2024-25 LEI decline will be the largest false signal in the series history and may force a methodological review of the index construction (particularly the heavy manufacturing weight).
Why the 2024-25 Decline May Not Have Produced Recession
Several factors specific to the 2024-25 cycle help explain the unusual non-recession outcome (so far). First, the LEI's heavy manufacturing weight (approximately 65 percent of components are manufacturing-related) means a manufacturing-specific contraction can drive the headline LEI down even if the broader services-dominant economy is holding up. The 2024-25 weakness was largely manufacturing-specific, driven by tariff uncertainty, global trade slowdown, and a slowing of the post-COVID inventory rebuild. The Services PMI and broader services-sector employment held up throughout the period.
Second, the labour market remained tight throughout the period. Initial jobless claims, one of the LEI's components, stayed below 250,000 (4-week average) for almost all of 2024-25. The labour-market component therefore stayed closer to neutral than the headline aggregate suggested. Strong labour markets are typically inconsistent with imminent recession, regardless of what other indicators are saying.
Third, the COVID-era fiscal and monetary stimulus had built household and corporate cash balances that delayed the transmission of monetary tightening to economic activity. Household savings remained elevated through 2024 (the personal saving rate was approximately 5 percent against a 2010-19 average closer to 7 percent, but absolute household financial assets remained at record levels). Corporate cash balances were similarly elevated. The buffers allowed economic activity to continue at higher levels than monetary tightening alone would have implied.
Whichever combination of these factors most explains the 2024-25 episode, the implication for the LEI's ongoing reliability is significant. If the index has structural problems for the modern services-dominant US economy, future LEI signals will need to be interpreted with greater caution. The Conference Board has acknowledged the question and is reportedly conducting a methodological review.
The 2026 Stabilisation
Through 2026 the LEI's steep multi-year decline has eased to a roughly flat trend, though the monthly path has been choppy rather than a clean turn. The index rose in February 2026, fell 0.6 percent in March, and edged up 0.1 percent in April to 97.4. The Conference Board has attributed the April improvement mainly to a rebound in stock prices and a pickup in building permits; the interest-rate-spread component has also turned more supportive as the yield curve re-steepened, while several manufacturing-related components remained soft.
A single positive month does not establish a trend, and the alternating signs in early 2026 underline that. A sustained run of positive monthly readings would be needed for the 6-month rate of change to cross convincingly above zero and clear the formal recession-watch signal. The May 2026 reading, due 18 June 2026, is the next data point; renewed declines would show the stabilisation had stalled rather than turned.
The Live 2026 Recession-Monitoring Application
Within the current recession-monitoring dashboard, the LEI provides an ambiguous reading. The decline has eased to roughly flat, with mixed recent prints (March down, April up). The 6-month rate of change is improving but has hovered near zero. The level of the index remains well below 2022 highs. The interpretation depends on how much weight to assign to the long 2022-24 decline (which would historically have been a strong recession signal) versus the 2026 stabilisation (which suggests the cyclical bottom may be near).
The most defensible reading is that the LEI signal has weakened substantially from its 2024 strength. The combination of the manufacturing-specific character of the 2024-25 decline and the recent inflection suggests the LEI is now less recession-watch than it was twelve months ago. Other indicators (the Sahm rule, jobless claims, the yield curve un-inversion) remain the more important data points for the live recession-monitoring exercise.
For the broader indicator dashboard, see indicators. For the most reliable recession indicator historically, see the yield curve. For the cleanest real-time labour-market indicator, see the Sahm rule. For probability-model integration, see recession probability models.
The Ten LEI Components
| Component | Weight | Role | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Average weekly hours, manufacturing | 21.4% | Manufacturing labour-market signal | BLS CES |
| Average weekly initial jobless claims | 10.4% | Real-time labour-market signal | DOL ETA |
| Manufacturers new orders, consumer goods | 5.7% | Forward consumer demand | Census M3 survey |
| ISM new orders index | 21.4% | Manufacturing forward demand | ISM monthly |
| Manufacturers new orders, nondefense capital goods ex aircraft | 8.2% | Business investment intentions | Census M3 survey |
| Building permits, new private housing units | 9.1% | Housing-cycle leading signal | Census permits data |
| S&P 500 stock prices | 7.6% | Market-based growth expectations | S&P Dow Jones Indices |
| Leading Credit Index | 10.5% | Credit-market stress composite | Conference Board internal |
| Interest rate spread (10Y Treasury minus federal funds rate) | 13.5% | Yield-curve recession signal | FRED |
| Average consumer expectations for business conditions | 5.2% | Forward consumer confidence | U Mich consumer sentiment |
Source: The Conference Board Leading Economic Index methodology.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the Conference Board LEI?
The Leading Economic Index is a composite of ten forward-looking economic indicators, published monthly by The Conference Board, a non-profit business membership and research organisation. The index is designed to anticipate turning points in the US business cycle, typically leading recession peaks by 3 to 9 months and recession troughs by similar lead-times. The index has been published continuously since the early 1960s, with the current composition (ten components) established in 1996. The components include manufacturing-sector indicators, labour-market measures, financial-market signals, building permits, and consumer expectations.
What is the current LEI reading?
As of June 2026, the latest published reading is for April 2026, when the LEI rose 0.1 percent month-over-month to 97.4 (2016 = 100), following a 0.6 percent decline in March. After a long multi-year decline through 2022-2024, the index has roughly levelled off in 2026, with recent monthly prints small and mixed rather than uniformly negative. The Conference Board's preferred 6-month annualised rate of change has improved markedly from the deeply negative readings of 2024, though the index level remains well below its 2022 high. The May 2026 reading is due 18 June 2026.
What level signals a recession?
The Conference Board uses three rules of thumb. First, a 6-month annualised change of negative 4 percent or worse, sustained for several months, is a recession-watch signal. Second, six consecutive months of negative monthly readings is a recession-warning signal. Third, the diffusion index of components (the percentage of components rising versus falling) below 50 sustained is a confirming signal. All three rules were triggered through 2024-25, but the predicted recession did not materialise on schedule. The 2024-25 episode is the cleanest historical false signal in the LEI's 60-year history. The improving 2026 readings suggest the false signal is now resolving.
What are the 10 components?
The current LEI components are: average weekly hours in manufacturing (21.4 percent weight); average weekly initial jobless claims (10.4 percent); manufacturers new orders for consumer goods and materials (5.7 percent); the ISM new orders sub-index (21.4 percent); manufacturers new orders for nondefense capital goods excluding aircraft (8.2 percent); building permits for new private housing units (9.1 percent); the S&P 500 stock price index (7.6 percent); the Leading Credit Index, a Conference Board composite of credit-market stress indicators (10.5 percent); the interest rate spread between 10-year Treasury and federal funds rate (13.5 percent); and the University of Michigan consumer expectations index (5.2 percent). The weights have been periodically rebalanced to reflect changing economic structure and indicator reliability.
How accurate has the LEI been historically?
The LEI has confirmed every NBER-dated US recession since 1959, with average lead-time of 3 to 9 months from the LEI peak to the recession peak. The most reliable confirming signal is the 6-month annualised rate of change crossing negative 4 percent. False signals have been rare but not absent. The 1995-96 LEI decline did not produce a recession (the Fed engineered a soft landing). The 2015-16 LEI decline did not produce a recession (similar manufacturing-specific weakness without broader propagation). The 2024-25 LEI decline is the longest non-recessionary period of sustained decline in the series history and is the largest false signal to date if no recession occurs in 2026 or 2027.
Why did the 2024-25 LEI decline not produce a recession?
Several reasons specific to the 2024-25 cycle. First, the LEI has heavy manufacturing weight (the ISM new orders, manufacturing hours, building permits, and consumer goods orders together carry approximately 65 percent of the index weight), and the 2024-25 weakness was largely manufacturing-specific in a US economy that is now 88 percent services. Second, the labour market remained tight throughout the period (initial claims stayed below 250k for almost all of 2024-25), keeping that LEI component closer to neutral than the headline aggregate suggested. Third, the COVID-era fiscal and monetary stimulus had built household and corporate cash buffers that delayed transmission of monetary tightening to economic activity. The 2024-25 episode may force a methodological review of the LEI weights to better reflect the modern services-heavy US economy.
Has the long LEI decline ended?
Not definitively, but the steep declines of 2022-2024 have given way to a roughly flat trend in 2026. Recent prints have been small and mixed: the index rose in February 2026, fell 0.6 percent in March, and edged up 0.1 percent in April to 97.4. The improvement in the 6-month rate of change has been driven in part by the yield-curve re-steepening (the interest-rate-spread component) and steadier financial markets, partly offsetting still-soft manufacturing components. A clear, sustained run of positive monthly readings would be needed to call the long downtrend over; the May 2026 reading is due 18 June 2026.